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POPULATION AGEING IN JAPAN:  POLICY LESSONS FOR
SOUTH-EAST ASIA
David E. Horlacher* and Landis MacKellar**
The paper reviews population trends in Japan with a view to showing that
there has been substantial ageing of the Japanese population since 1950.
The next 50 years will intensify this trend.  The paper also analyses the
economic consequences of this process and draws conclusions and lessons
for the South-East Asian economies that are facing a similar demographic
trajectory.
When the Japanese children who are born this year are themselves elderly,
they will be living in a nation that is continuing to grow smaller and older.  Will such
a nation be able to make the necessary savings and be able to increase the labour
productivity to the degree that will be needed to support those children in their old
age?1  And what will all this mean for other regions of the world, such as South-East
Asia?
Projections of population decline and population ageing have caused the
Japanese Government to fear a loss of economic dynamism and difficulties in financing
its pension and health schemes.  Businessmen worry about the loss of customers and
labour shortages and middle-aged adults worry about the availability of support in old
age (Ogawa 2000).  This widespread concern in Japan about population ageing is
a prudent response to a demographic inevitability.  In future decades, its population
will age more rapidly than any country has ever done before.  The proportion of the
aged population will double from 10 to 20 per cent in less than 25 years.  In contrast,
most European countries took more than 50 years to travel the same distance.  It
should be noted, however, that some countries in South-East Asia, such as Singapore
and Thailand, are set to traverse this distance even more rapidly than Japan.
Population ageing is a normal part of the modernization process whereby
increased opportunities for women lead to lower fertility and improved medical care
extends the life spans of older adults.  In Japan’s case, however, the fertility of Japanese
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women fell faster than had ever occurred before, even as Japan achieved one with the
world’s highest life expectancies at birth in just a few decades.  Furthermore, there
are few signs of self-correcting tendencies that would slow the population ageing
process or even prevent its acceleration.
This paper will first review population trends in Japan with a view to showing
that there has already been substantial ageing of the Japanese population and that the
next 50 years should bring additional ageing.  Furthermore, there is little likelihood
that these trends can be reversed.  The first section of this paper describes the economic
issues raised by the ageing of the Japanese population in the context of population
decline.  Emphasis is placed on the role of population ageing in the accumulation of
capital, labour and technological progress and in the fiscal problems facing the Japanese
pension and health systems.  The last section of this paper argues that the experiences
of Japan are very relevant to the countries of South-East Asia.  The future demographic
trajectory of the region closely tracks the actual path of the Japanese population
during the last half-century.  Assuming that the future economic and demographic
situation of South-East Asia will be comparable to that observed in the case of Japan,
a number of lessons based on the Japanese experience are drawn.
I.  THE POPULATION OF JAPAN WILL CONTINUE
TO GROW OLDER
As has been widely described, the population in Japan is close to peaking
and will soon begin a prolonged decline.  In this section we will focus on the age
structure of the population and the determinants of current trends.  The median age of
the Japanese population has increased from 22 years in 1950 to 41 years in 2000
and by mid-century, fully half the population of Japan will be over the age of 53
(see figure 1.1).
Source: United Nations, (2002) World Population Prospects Database.
Figure 1.1.  Median age, Japan, 1950-2050
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Declining fertility combined with increasing longevity will cause the Japanese
population to age rapidly.  The young-age share of the population, now 15 per cent of
the total population, will fall to 11 per cent by 2050.  The working-age population,
now almost 70 per cent of the total will fall to 55 per cent in 2050.  Meanwhile, the
old-age (65+) share will grow from 17 per cent of the population today to more than
36 per cent in 2050 (see figure 1.2).  No nation has ever experienced such rapid
ageing.
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, (2001).
Figure 1.2.  Proportions of the population by age group,
Japan, 1920-2050
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Figure 1.3 shows the population pyramids for Japan at three points in time,
1950, 2000 and 2050.  Clearly the young cohorts that make up the base are shrinking
while the elderly cohorts at the top are increasing.  The young age groups declined
and the older age groups increased.  Projections for the first half of the twenty-first
century indicate that this trend will continue.  Not only will the young age groups
(the groups that would give birth to the children) decline, so also will the working age
groups.  Only the dependent elderly will increase, thus placing a heavy burden on
a shrinking working age population.
Figure 1.4 presents dependency rates.  Between 1950 and 1970, Japan enjoyed
a demographic “Golden Age” where the rapid decline in young age dependents caused
the total dependency rate to fall.  But by 2010, the growing old-age dependency rate
will start to push up the total dependency rate and by 2050, Japan will have more
than 85 dependents for every 100 of working age.
The age structure was largely unchanged in the first half of the twentieth
century because declines in infant mortality had offset the declines in fertility.  By the
end of the century, however, infant mortality had fallen to 3.3 infant deaths per thousand
live births, leaving little scope for further improvement.  In the second half of the
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Figure 1.3.  Changes in the population pyramid
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications;
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
Government of Japan, (2001).
Figure 1.4.  Dependency rates, Japan, 1920-2050
(per cent of the working age population)
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, (2001).
twentieth century, lifestyle changes in Japan reduced deaths from heart disease and
stroke, increasing life expectancy at age 65 and contributing to population ageing (see
figure 1.5).
The main cause of the ageing of the Japanese population is the rapid decline
in fertility, from a TFR of nearly 5 births per woman in 1930 to a TFR of 1.36 in
2000 (see figure 1.6).  That is far below the replacement level.  Though there has
been a steady fall in the TFR, the marital total fertility rate has remained constant at
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Figure 1.5.  Life expectancy at age 65, males and females,
Japan, 1950-2000
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Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, (2001).
Figure 1.6.  Actual and replacement total fertility rates,
Japan, 1930-2050
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Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, (2001) and (2002).
about 2.0 children per married woman because age-specific marital fertility rates have
not changed (see figure 1.7).
The real causes of the fertility decline are delayed age at first marriage and
increased lifetime celibacy.  The proportion of Japanese women who are married has
steadily declined because of higher ages at marriage and an increasing proportion of
women who never marry at all.  The average age at marriage has gone up by 3 years
since 1975 and the proportion of women who are not likely to marry at all increased
from 5 to 15 per cent in the same period.  As a result, almost 50 per cent of Japanese
women in the prime childbearing ages, 25 to 29, are not married (see figure 1.8).
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Figure 1.7.  Age-specific fertility rate for married women,
Japan, 1950-2000
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Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, (2001).
Figure 1.8.  Proportion of females never married, by age,
Japan, 1930-2050
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Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, (2001).
Women are delaying marriage to take advantage of increased opportunities
for higher education and improved employment opportunities.  In Japan, the average
age at marriage for women who are university graduates was about 28 years, as
compared with about 26 years for high school graduates (see figure 1.9) As women
have acquired more education, their salaries have increased, which in turn has raised
the opportunity cost of withdrawing from the labour force to rear children.  This is
especially true for women under 30, whose wages rose from 70 per cent of men’s
wages in 1970 to almost 90 per cent in 2000.
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The pressure to care for the elderly contributes to lower fertility.  By 2025,
Japan will have 5.2 million elderly requiring full-time care.  At the same time, there
will be fewer middle-aged women to care for them.  The likelihood that a woman
may have to give up a full time job to care for an elderly parent is rapidly increasing.
By 2025, almost half of non-working middle-aged women will be providing elder
care.
The benefits of children are not what they once were in Japan.  Already,
fewer than half of elderly women live with their children.  Furthermore, the steady
improvement in public and private pension schemes has dramatically reduced the
proportion of couples that plan to rely on their children for old-age support.  While
the value of children as a source of old-age support has been declining, the direct and
opportunity costs associated with childrearing have been increasing.  Though the
Japanese Government provides monthly allowances for children, they do not cover
the costs of having a child.
It would be possible to prevent the ageing of the Japanese population by
allowing increased international migration.  However, such migration is not currently
permitted nor is it likely to be permitted in the future.  The United Nations (2001) has
calculated the amount of migration necessary to keep the ratio of the working-age
population to the retired-age population at its 1995 level.  It has calculated that Japan
would have to admit an average of 10 million immigrants per year over the next
50 years.  Though such an inflow would maintain the age structure, it would result in
the growth of the total population to 818 million in 2050.  Furthermore, 87 per cent
of that population would be comprised of immigrants or their descendants.
Figure 1.9.  Enrolment rates in higher education,
Japan, 1955-1995
Source: Ogawa and Clark, (1995) and Mason and Ogawa (2001).
1955 1975 1995
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Females
Males
Year
Pe
r 
ce
n
t
Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 10, No. 1, June 2003
104
Both fertility and mortality are likely to decline, while there is little chance
of increased immigration.  Hence, population ageing is a near certainty.  Let us now
consider how Japan will cope with the economic effects of ageing.
II.  THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION AGEING
Japanese GDP is growing slowly
In the three decades between 1965 and 1995, Japanese real GDP more
than tripled and by 2000, real GDP (in 1995 prices) had risen to 518 trillion yen
($ 4.5 trillion), (Government of Japan, 2001) The years between 1945 and the
mid-1970s was the period of most rapid growth (about 8 per cent per year).  Since
then, there has been a significant fall in the rate of growth of GDP.  Figure 2.1 shows
that the growth rate of Japanese GDP has been very low (or negative) during most of
the 1990s.
Figure 2.1.  Annual rates of growth of GDP,
Japan, 1905-2000
Source: Itoh, (1996).
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In 1960, per capita GDP in Japan was equivalent to $ 4,700 in purchasing
power parity terms.  By the year 2000, that figure had risen to $ 24,900.  The average
annual rate of growth of per capita GDP had fallen 0.5 per cent between 1991 and
2000.  The Japan Center for Economic Research (1998) projected that, over the next
25 years, total GDP will fall but per capita GDP will continue to grow, albeit slowly.
Rates of saving and investment will decline
The changing age structure will have three major impacts on Japan’s
productive capacity.  It will reduce rates of saving and capital accumulation.  It will
shrink the labour force (though it may increase its stock of human capital).  Finally,
population ageing may slow the growth in total factor productivity.
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The future course of Japanese savings rates will depend on the strength of
the factors likely to reduce savings rates relative to factors likely to increase them.
Among the former are:  (1) the ageing of the population, (2) the decline in economic
growth rates, and (3) an increase in the retirement age.  Among the factors that are
likely to increase savings rates in Japan are:  (1) the decline in the labour force
participation rates of the elderly, and (2) increases in life expectancy at retirement.
It is likely the factors exerting downward pressure on saving will predominate.  To
forecast what will happen to savings rates, it is necessary to understand why they
were so high in the past.
(i) Why were Japanese savings rates so high?
Many explanations revolve around the life cycle hypothesis of Modigliani
and Brumberg (1980), which predicts that individuals will finance their consumption
during retirement by dissaving.  If the labour force is shrinking, then the saving of
workers will fall short of the dissaving of retirees and there will be a negative effect
on net household saving.  If this hypothesis is true, the ageing of the Japanese
population will put downward pressure on saving rates.
Currently Japan saves a little less than one-third of its GDP (see figure 2.2).
The gross national saving rate peaked at about 1991 and has generally declined since
then.  Even so, Japan has the highest savings rate among the developed countries.
It is considerably higher than the rates of Germany and the United States.
Source: Miranda, (1999), Table 2-1 and IMF, (1999).
Figure 2.2.  Gross national saving rate,
Japan, 1984-1998
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Yashiro (1997) contended that despite these age profiles, the elderly as
a group, do indeed dissave.  Often household-based studies look only at the one third
of the elderly who maintain independent households, i.e. the households most likely
to save.  But about two thirds of the elderly population are dependent on their children
and are often left out of household studies of elderly savings behaviour.  When this
factor is taken into account, his data show that the elderly do dissave as predicted by
the life cycle theory.
The high labour force participation among Japanese males aged 65 and over
might help to explain the high rate of savings in Japan.  If so, efforts to increase the
mandatory retirement age to 65 might reduce the household savings rate by increasing
the labour force participation of the elderly.  The life cycle hypothesis also predicts
that the saving rate will increase along with life expectancy at retirement.  Since the
life expectancy of the Japanese population at older ages is increasing, this would also
put upward pressure on the saving rate.
A number of hypotheses link Japan’s high saving rate to its rapid rate of
economic growth.  One of these, the permanent income hypothesis, asserts that increases
in Japanese income were not expected and were therefore considered to be transitory.
Most of such income is saved.  However time series studies have not supported
explanations of Japan’s high saving rates based on rapid income growth.  For example,
there was only a moderate decline in savings rates after 1974 even though there was
a sharp decline in the growth rate of income.
Many of the challenges to the application of the life cycle hypothesis to
Japan centre on whether the elderly really do dissave.  Figure 2.3 presents a typical
age profile of savings rates in Japan based on household survey data.  It shows that
even the oldest age group has a positive savings rate.
Source: Yoshikawa et al. (2002).
Figure 2.3.  Saving rates by age group, Japan, 1999
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(ii) What will happen to Japanese savings rates?
Researchers have made projections of future Japanese savings rates using
a variety of techniques.  Although there was no agreement on the amount of the
decline, they all found that Japan’s savings rate would decline in the twenty-first
century.  Horioka (1989), for example, projected that Japan’s saving rate would become
negative early in the twenty-first century and fall to levels between -10 and -20 per
cent of personal income throughout the first half of the century (see figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4.  Projected personal savings rates, Japan
Source: Horioka, (1989).
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Not all economists predicted an immediate decline in savings.  Ando et al.,
(1995) projected that in the early stages of population ageing, the higher saving of
middle-aged couples would more than offset the decline in saving by the oldest group
of individuals and families.  But after 2020, the share of children in the population
will not decline very much while the share of persons 70 and above will rise
significantly.  Hence, the saving rate will drop to 10 per cent of income.
(iii) Domestic and international investment
The ultimate effect of population ageing on that balance will depend on the
size of the decline in domestic investment relative to the decline in savings.  If the
decline in savings is greater, Japan’s external balance will fall, since the current account
balance relative to GDP is equal to the saving rate minus the domestic investment
rate.
Population ageing will have opposing effects on domestic investment.  On
the one hand, a declining labour force may stimulate the demand for labour saving
investment.  On the other, the decline in profit rates due to the reduced labour supply
and the higher interest rates may discourage investment.  Auerbach et al.  (1989), find
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that the decline in saving will ultimately outweigh the decline in investment and
Japan’s current account surplus will eventually become a current account deficit.
In a multi-country simulation analysis, Masson and Tryon (1990) found that
over the period 1995-2025 the current account/GDP ratio would fall by 4 percentage
points.  In the process of declining by this much, the current account balance would
be negative by 2000 and would continue to fall until at least 2015.
Higgins and Williamson (1996) come to the opposite conclusion.  They argued
that an increasing old age dependency rate has a greater impact on domestic investment
than on saving.  Hence, the current account surplus of Japan is likely to grow.
Williamson and Higgins (2001) predict that between 1990 and 2025, the share of the
current account balance in Japan’s GDP will increase by 2 percentage points.  At this
point, there seems to be no consensus on the effect that population ageing will have
on Japan’s future stock of foreign or domestic capital.
The labour supply is shrinking
Much of the economic growth of Japan occurred in the latter half of the
1950s and 1960s when the labour force was growing rapidly and was therefore
relatively young.  At that time, employers could draw on a large stock of well-educated
young workers who were willing to work for relatively low wages.  The lower wages
paid to young workers, combined with their high levels of education, powered Japan’s
economic growth.  In the twenty-first century, however, the labour force will grow
slowly and will continue to age (see figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5.  Labour force growth rates, Japan,
1980-1990 to 2010-2020
Source: Yashiro (1997), table 1.
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The Japanese labour force now embodies even more human capital.  Between
1970 and 1988, the proportion of workers who had completed college or university
had more than doubled.  Chiefly as a result of economic development, but also as
a result of changes in household composition, education and social welfare systems,
there has been a significant decline in the labour force participation rates (LFPRs) of
Japanese men and a much smaller decline in the LFPRs of women (see figure 2.6)
There was a significant decline in the LFPRs of young people aged 15 to 19,
which was partially offset by a substantial increase in the LFPR of unmarried women
aged 25-29.
Figure 2.6.  Labour force participation rates, age 15 and above,
Japan, 1960-2000
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2001).
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The LFPRs of the elderly males in Japan are quite high compared to
other developed nations (see figure 2.7).  Though these rates have been falling
(see figure 2.8) Yashiro, et al. (1997) suggest that the labour force participation of
older workers may increase as a result of the 2000 pension reforms, which reduced
benefits and increased the age of eligibility for public pensions to 65.
Historically, the distinguishing features of the Japanese labour market were
a seniority-based wage system and lifetime employment.  Those institutions provided
workers with job stability and employers with high levels of effort and low turnover.
Seniority-based wages, worked well when the labour force was growing rapidly.  At
that time, a large pool of younger workers who were receiving less than their
productivity were supporting deferred payments to a smaller group of older workers
who were receiving more than their productivity warranted.  Since older workers
were being paid more than their productivity, however, employers needed a system of
mandatory retirement.
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Figure 2.7.  Labour force participation rates of older males,
selected OECD countries, 1996
Figure 2.8.  Male labour force participation, aged 60-74,
Japan, 1960-2000
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Source: OECD (1997) Labour Force Statistics.
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2001).
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By the year 2000, more than 99 per cent of firms had set their mandatory
retirement age at 60, or older (Ohtake and Yamaga, 2002).  However, more than
70 per cent of them allowed some workers to continue past the mandatory retirement
age or re-employed them at lower pay.  On average, these men receive wages 20 to
40 per cent below their pre-retirement wages.  It is this reduction in wages that has
made it economical for employers to continue employing elderly workers.
The age of eligibility for public pensions is gradually increasing to age 65.
This will pose serious difficulties for those workers who were subject to mandatory
retirement at age 60 and who are unable to find re-employment.  Even now, elderly
men suffer from 10 per cent rates of unemployment in Japan.
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Japan’s labour supply is likely to fall rapidly in future decades.  Not only is
the working age population shrinking, hours worked per month and labour force
participation rates are also declining.  Furthermore, Japan can no longer assume that
its labour force will be fully employed.  Since the labour supply is likely to fall and
the rate of capital formation is likely to stagnate, the chances of maintaining economic
growth in the twenty-first century depend crucially on accelerating the rate of growth
of productivity.
Productivity growth is slowing
Kosai, Saito and Yashiro (1998) demonstrated that increasing the efficiency
of the economic system might largely offset the effects of population ageing and
allow sustained economic growth in spite of a declining population.  In the face of
an increasing scarcity of labour, firms would seek to employ their workers more
efficiently.  Thus a decline in the labour supply should be accompanied by an increase
in productivity.
Curiously, this does not seem to have happened in Japan where the slowing
of labour force growth has been accompanied by a steady decline in the growth of
various measures of productivity.  From 1983 to 1990, Japanese total factor productivity
grew at about 2.4 per cent per year.  However that rate fell precipitously to 0.2 per
cent per year in the following decade.  Itoh (1996) had earlier shown that the rate of
productivity growth has slowed (figure 2.9).  Wolff (2001) found that the growth rate
of labour productivity in manufacturing had fallen to less than one per cent per year
in the early part of the 1990s.  Japan’s best real hope for avoiding economic stagnation
is to increase productivity.  However, Japan is already on the technological frontier.
If productivity is to grow rapidly, Japan must take the lead in advancing industrial
technology.
Figure 2.9.  Growth rate of productivity, Japan, 1960-1992
Source: Itoh (1996), table 3.
1960-67 1971-81 1981-92
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Whole economy
Tradeables
Nontradeables
Period
Pe
r 
ce
n
t p
er
 
ye
ar
Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 10, No. 1, June 2003
112
The fiscal impact of the pension and health systems
Not only are the pension and health insurance schemes vitally important to
the elderly population of Japan, they are also major determinants of whether the
Government’s accounts are in surplus or deficit and thus the national savings rate.  In
the future, the national saving rate may fall precipitously because of deficits in these
schemes.
The Japanese social security system has three major components:  medical
care, pensions and welfare.  Measured by expenditures, public pension schemes are
the most significant components of the system.  The economic impact of the social
security system is enormous.  In fiscal year 2002, social security contributions equaled
15.5 per cent of national income.  Together, social security contributions and income
taxes removed about 38 per cent of national income that might otherwise have gone
to private consumption spending or saving.
(i) Public pensions
Japan’s public pension system is essentially a pay as you go system in which
current benefits are financed by current contributions.  It is a two-tier system.  The
first tier, or National Pension Scheme (NPS), is a public programme that covers all
residents older than 65 and provides them with a flat pension.  The second tier, or
Employee Pension Insurance (EPI), covers most salaried workers.
There was a major expansion of pension benefits in 1973.  The replacement
rate was increased to about 60 per cent.  However, the newly expanded pension
system quickly ran into trouble, and in 1986, revenues were increased and benefits
reduced.  By 1994, there had been a further deterioration of system finances and
a new round of reform measures was introduced.  The goal of the 1994 reform was to
ensure that there would be adequate reserves even at the peak period of population
ageing.  However, the reforms were not sufficient to meet the demands placed on the
pension system by Japan’s rapidly ageing population.  Yashiro and others (1997)
warned that the large stock of assets in the pension system would be exhausted well
before the peak in system dependency ratios.  In the absence of further reforms, they
projected huge deficits in the pension fund balances by 2050 (see figure 2.10).
Eventually it became clear that the 1994 pension reforms would not restore
the Japanese Social Security programme to an actuarially sound basis.  In March
2000, the Diet enacted additional reforms that would cut lifetime pensions by about
20 per cent.  Most importantly, pensions were to be indexed to consumer prices rather
than wages.  Thus, the real purchasing power of pensions would remain constant;
even while the real incomes of contributors was rising.
The impact of this change can be gauged by comparing their projected
replacement ratios, with and without pension reform.  If pensions had continued to be
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indexed to wages, the net replacement rate in 2050 would have exceeded 50 per cent
of after tax income (Yashiro and others 1997).  By indexing pensions to prices, the
net replacement ratio will be cut to less than 20 per cent.
Since even the 2000 reforms may not be adequate to meet the pension
obligations to a rapidly growing population of retirees, various options for reducing
outflow and increasing revenues of the pension system are under consideration.  One
way to cut benefits is to link them to average life expectancy.  Another option is to
raise the age at which individuals become eligible for benefits from 65 years to
67 years.
The main drawback of these strategies is their adverse impact on the standard
of living of the elderly.  In 1999, pension payments accounted for roughly 60 per cent
of the income of elderly households and about half of such households rely solely on
public pensions for support.  An additional problem is that an extension of the eligibility
age for receiving a full pension may raise the already high unemployment rate of the
elderly.
Many Japanese are concerned that the present system unfairly redistributes
income from younger to older generations.  The pension system also limits the labour
force participation of older workers.  When they reach age 60, employees often have
the option of continuing work at a considerably lower wage.  If they do so, they may
lose a part of their pension, because public pensions are subject to an earnings test.
(ii) The health system
Total medical care expenditures (both public and private) grew from about
6 per cent of national income in 1982 to about 8 per cent of GDP.  Per capita medical
Figure 2.10.  Projection of pension fund balances,
Japan, 1995-2050
Source: Yashiro, Oshio and Matsuya (1997).
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expenditures grew at 5.5 per cent per annum between 1980 and 1997 and they are
projected to grow by an additional 40 per cent over the next three decades.
The share of the elderly in total health care costs has risen from about 14 per
cent in 1975 to 31 per cent in 1995; by 2025, the elderly are projected to account for
half of total costs.  In 1999, the annual medical costs of persons over 65 were
8.3 times the cost of those between 14 and 44 years old (see figure 2.11).  Consequently
the elderly who made up only 17 per cent of the population accounted for 51 per cent
of aggregate medical expenses.
Figure 2.11.  Annual cost of medical care by age group,
Japan, 1999
Source: Takayama, (2002).
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In 1990 the “Golden Plan” was instituted to reduce the demand for medical
services by improving social services for the elderly and their families and by providing
long-term care services.  The major part of the Golden Plan is directed at improving
home-based services for the elderly.  In April of that year, Japan implemented
a system of Long-Term Care Insurance.  Because it covers care that was previously
provided partly by health insurance and partly by welfare measures, the new programme
will significantly decrease welfare spending.  And by providing long-term care at
home, it should reduce the demand for hospitalization and thereby slow the growth of
medical spending.
In the absence of large-scale international migration to Japan, it is virtually
certain that the dependency ratios of its various pension and health programmes will
grow rapidly in the next half century.  The only way to lighten the heavy burden that
must be borne by the working age populations of the future will be to greatly increase
their productivity.  This will require a reversal of current trends in saving rates and
productivity growth, a task made more difficult because those trends are also the
effects of population ageing.
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III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA
MacKellar and others (2002) observed that a half century ago “Japan was
a poor country with a dismally overcrowded agricultural sector and an under-capitalized
industrial sector producing simple consumer goods.”  Fifty years later, Japan is among
the richest countries in the world.  But reduced young age dependency that promoted
a high savings rate is rapidly leading to increased old age dependency, with the opposite
effect.  In the next century we shall see the “unwinding” of the demographic component
of the Japanese economic miracle.
There is good reason to expect that in the first half of the twenty-first century,
the nations of South-East Asia will follow a demographic trajectory that closely tracks
that of Japan in the last half of the twenty-first century.  For South-East Asia the next
50 years will be a period of decelerating population growth combined with rapid
population ageing.  By 2150, the demographic profile of South-East Asia should closely
resemble that of Japan in 2000 and many of the same economic issues currently
facing Japan will be challenging the nations of South-East Asia.  However, the scale
of these problems will be much larger in South-East Asia since its population in 2000
was more than 522 million as compared with a Japanese population of about
84 million in 1950 (United Nations 2002).
The 5.4 per cent growth rate of GDP in South-East Asia is not dissimilar to
that of Japan in 1950.  Nevertheless, South-East Asia must begin its economic climb
from a much lower base.  In the year 2000, per capita income in South-East Asia was
$ 1,121, about one fourth the per capita income in Japan in 1960 ($ 4,672).
Nevertheless, it should be possible to draw some lessons from the Japanese experience
that have policy significance for South-East Asia.
Similar long run demographic trajectories
Between 2000-2005 and 2045-2050, the growth rate of South-East Asia’s
population is projected to fall from 1.4 per cent per annum to 0.4 per cent.  Between
1950-1955 and 1995-2000, the growth rate of the Japanese population fell by about
the same amount, though not as smoothly (see figure 3.1).
In the next 50 years, the pattern of population ageing in South-East Asia will
be nearly the same as that of Japan in the latter half of the twentieth century.  In
South-East Asia, the median age will rise from 24 years in 2000 to 38 years in 2050.
The median age in Japan rose from 22 years in 1950 to 41 years in 2000
(see figure 3.2).  The growth of the elderly population in South-East Asia will closely
parallel that of Japan during the last half of the twentieth century (see figure 3.3).  In
South-East Asia, the population aged 65-and-older will rise from 4.7 per cent in 2000
to 16 per cent in 2050.  In Japan, the population aged 65-and-older rose from 4.9 per
cent in 1950 to 17 per cent in 2000.
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Figure 3.1.  Growth rate of population, Japan and South-East Asia,
1950-1955 to 2045-2050
Source: United Nations (2002) Population Prospects Database.
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Figure 3.2.  Median age, Japan and South-East Asia, 1950-2050
Source: United Nations (2002) Population Prospects Database.
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Though the TFR is projected to fall rapidly in South-East Asia from 2.52 in
2000-2005 to 2.08 in 2045-2050, that is not nearly as rapid as the fall that occurred
in Japan where the TFR collapsed from 2.75 in 1950-1955 to 1.36 in 2000
(see figure 3.4) However, the flattening of the TFR in South-East Asia is really
an artifact of the United Nations’ projection system.  In reality, fertility in that region
is likely to fall below replacement sometime before 2025 and continue falling.
As in the case of fertility, the decline in mortality in South-East Asia will not
be quite as dramatic as in Japan during the last half of the twentieth century.
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Figure 3.3.  Share of the population aged 65 and older,
Japan and South-East Asia, 1950-2050
Source: United Nations (2002) Population Prospects Database.
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Figure 3.4.  Total fertility rate, Japan and South-East Asia,
1950-1955 to 2045-2050
Source: United Nations (2002) Population Prospects Database.
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Life expectancy at birth for both sexes combined in South-East Asia was 67 years in
2000-2005 and is projected to rise to 77.3 years in 2045-2050, a gain of about
10 years.  In Japan, combined life expectancy at birth grew from 64 years in
1950-1955 to 80.5 years in 1995-2000, a gain of 16.5 years (see figure 3.5).
Clearly, in the next half century, the demography of South-East Asia will
tread the same paths as Japan traveled during the last half of the twentieth century.
While some nations may travel that path a bit more slowly than Japan did, others may
experience even more rapid ageing than Japan.  Two such nations are Thailand and
Singapore.
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Policy implications for South-East Asia
Japan is on the frontier of our knowledge of how to adapt to a rapidly ageing
population.  She had to break the path that the nations of South-East Asia must
follow.  It should be possible to distill some insights from Japan’s experience that
might be applied by the nations of South-East Asia as they age rapidly over the next
50 years.  Seven lessons that seem particularly useful are:
 Avoid increasing inequality
 Make more efficient use of the labour force
 Provide incentives for saving
 Be wary of investing abroad
 Promote the education of young people
 Limit commitments for public pensions and health care
 Index pensions to prices – not wages
We discuss each of these recommendations in turn.
Population ageing redistributes income from older workers to younger ones.
It also increases the weight of age groups where the distribution of income is relatively
equal to age groups in which it is not.  In view of the already substantial degree of
economic inequality in some South-East Asian nations, it will be necessary to undertake
efforts in other spheres to offset the increasing inequality due to population ageing.
Making more efficient use of labour has three components:  (1) maintain
a flexible labour system; (2) employ scarce labour in the most efficient industries and
(3) enable women in the prime childbearing ages to combine motherhood and careers.
Figure 3.5.  Life expectancy at birth, Japan and South-East Asia,
1950-1955 to 2045-2050
Source: United Nations (2002) Population Prospects Database.
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The Japanese labour market is characterized by lifetime employment, seniority-based
compensation, and mandatory retirement at an early age.  The economies of
South-East Asia should try to avoid introducing such institutions into their labour
markets since the Japanese experience proves that once in place, they are extremely
difficult to remove, even in the face of a rapidly ageing labour force.
The countries of South-East Asia could offset the decline in their work forces
by utilizing labour more efficiently.  In particular, it should resist pressures to protect
inefficient industries.  By allowing markets to reallocate workers to their most
productive occupations, the countries of South-East Asia can moderate some of the
worst effects of a shrinking labour force.  Conversely, they can economize on what
will become scarce labour resources by specializing according to comparative advantage
and opening their markets to imported goods.
Though there is some scope for increasing the labour input of elderly males,
the increased utilization of women is Japan’s best hope for preventing a precipitous
fall in its labour force.  However, in Japan, many factors, especially the lack of day
care facilities for children and the lack of help with home-care of the aged, inhibit the
labour force participation of women.  As the societies of South-East Asia start to cope
with labour force decline, they should do their utmost to eliminate the disincentives to
female labour force participation.  By doing so they could neutralize a very large part
of the expected negative impact of demographic trends on their economies.
The ageing of the Japanese population is a significant factor underlying the
decline in household savings.  Hence, it is likely that population ageing will also put
downward pressure on household savings rates in South-East Asia.  It will also put
pressure on government fiscal balances, especially the balances of the pension and
health systems.  Heller (1998) projects that for a time, saving rates will increase in
the rapidly growing nations of South-East Asia.  After 2025, however, the aggregate
savings rate will decline.  Therefore, the Governments of the region should offset
a potential decline in their aggregate saving rates by providing significant incentives
to savers.
In the past, Japan dealt with low domestic interest rates by investing in
relatively capital-poor countries, such as the nations of South-East Asia.  In future
decades, it is likely that the countries of South-East Asia will also be investing abroad.
However, they should be forewarned that empirical and analytical studies by MacKellar
and Reisen (1998) and MacKellar and others (2002) indicate that the net returns to
those investments are likely to be modest.  On the other hand, investing domestically
will yield higher wages and higher wage tax revenues.
The increasing real wage due to population ageing might induce younger
cohorts to invest in more human capital, resulting in enhanced productivity.  On the
other hand, young cohorts might pass up advanced education to take advantage of
higher wages.  Hence, the countries of South-East Asia cannot assume that a slowing
in the accumulation of physical capital will be offset by an increased rate of
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accumulation of human capital.  They will have to actively promote the education of
young people.
Before the 2000 pension reforms, an increase in real wages in Japan always
caused an upward adjustment of pension benefits.  As a result, the payroll contribution
rate moved upwards in lockstep with increases in productivity.  Increases in labour
productivity failed to lighten the burden of the pension system because pensions
rose proportionately through the indexation process.  In establishing their pension
systems, the nations of South-East Asia should link benefit levels to prices.  If they
do, wage-based contribution rates need not increase so long as productivity grows
more rapidly than programme dependency rates.
Trends in fertility and mortality combined with an age structure that call for
fewer women to enter the childbearing years and for more adults to enter old age,
guarantees that over the next 50 years rapid population ageing in South-East Asia is
inevitable.  In the case of Japan, this process is leading to “economic stagnation”.
South-East Asia can avoid the same fate; but only if it acts wisely and soon.
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